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Abstract
From early on in life, children are able to use information from their environment to form pre-
dictions about events. For instance, they can use statistical information about a population
to predict the sample drawn from that population and infer an agent’s preferences from sys-
tematic violations of random sampling. We investigated whether and how young children
infer an agent’s sampling biases. Moreover, we examined whether pupil data of toddlers fol-
low the predictions of a computational model based on the causal Bayesian network formal-
ization of predictive processing. We formalized three hypotheses about how different
explanatory variables (i.e., prior probabilities, current observations, and agent characteris-
tics) are used to predict others’ actions. We measured pupillary responses as a behavioral
marker of ‘prediction errors’ (i.e., the perceived mismatch between what one’s model of an
agent predicts and what the agent actually does). Pupillary responses of 24-month-olds, but
not 18-month-olds, showed that young children integrated information about current obser-
vations, priors and agents to make predictions about agents and their actions. These find-
ings shed light on the mechanisms behind toddlers’ inferences about agent-caused events.
To our knowledge, this is the first study in which young children’s pupillary responses are
used as markers of prediction errors, which were qualitatively compared to the predictions
by a computational model based on the causal Bayesian network formalization of predictive
processing.
Introduction
From a very young age, children are able to infer that some events are more probable than oth-
ers. They use these inferences to form expectations about future events and show surprise
when these events unfold differently. When 12-month-old infants see a container in which
three identical objects and a single object move around before one of them exits the container,
they look longer when the single object leaves the container rather than one of the majority
objects [1]. A similar situation occurs when young children observe more or less probable
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actions of another person. Xu and Garcia (2008) showed that infants as young as eight months
of age look longer at a sample of colored balls if it is picked from a population of balls with
mostly other colors, suggesting that they were expecting a different sample given the popula-
tion [2]. In other words, if a population contains mainly red balls, infants expect sampling
from the population to be random, resulting in a sample of mainly red balls. If this expectation
is violated, this is reflected in an increased looking time. If, however, an agent consistently
picks the same items from a population in a non-random way (e.g., all white balls from a pre-
dominantly red population), the observer might interpret this as an indication of a preference
for a certain item. In a study by Kushnir, Xu, and Wellman (2010), 20-month-old children
observed an agent picking five toys of the same type from a population box that held mostly
toys from a different type [3]. When the toddlers were then asked to give the agent the toy he
liked best, they often chose the toy that the agent picked before. If, on the other hand, the
agent had picked the same toys from a population box in which the two types of toys were
more evenly distributed, they picked this toy less often. These results suggest that infants infer
preferences of others based on violation of random sampling.
Previous research has also shown that infants use probabilistic information to inform their
predictions about others’ actions. For example, Henrichs and colleagues (2014) investigated
whether goal certainty modulated action prediction patterns of 12-month-old infants [4]. In
an eye-tracking paradigm, infants observed hands reaching towards one of three objects on
the table, grasping the objects and placing them in a bowl. Infants performed earlier gaze shifts
in the frequent condition when the hand reached for the same object in all trials as compared
to the non-frequent condition, in which the hand reached for different objects across trials.
These findings indicate that infants use probabilistic data to make predictions about others’
actions.
Recent accounts suggest that humans generate internal models to predict incoming infor-
mation [5], [6]. This predicted input is compared to the actual input, and the difference (i.e.,
the prediction error) is used to update predictions. Previous studies have showed neural mark-
ers of prediction errors (e.g., [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]). Other studies suggest that prediction
errors can also be assessed through measurements of pupillary responses, as these have been
shown to correlate with prediction errors in a predictive-inference task [12] and with reward
prediction errors [13] in adults.
Because pupillary responses occur involuntarily without explicit instructions, the method
has also been valuable to unravel perceptual and cognitive processes in preverbal infants [14],
[15]. Particularly, pupil dilation has been assumed to represent infants’ violations of expecta-
tions [16], [17].For example, Addyman, Rocha, and Mareschal (2014) investigated time per-
ception in infants by using a paradigm in which recurring targets were omitted [18]. Results of
this study showed that 4- to 14–month-old infants showed increased pupil dilation to the
absence of the targets at anticipated time intervals indicating a violation of their expectations
of interval timing. In the present study, we take this approach one-step further and use infants’
pupillary responses as indirect behavioral markers of prediction errors in young children.
If young children predict other people’s actions in which the probability of events is repre-
sented, then we would expect to see increased pupil dilation when children observe improba-
ble events. Looking times may be expected to increase in a similar way. Although they are
indeed the most widely used measure of prediction violations [19], they are often measured
over relatively long periods after stimulus presentation (e.g., > 12 sec in [20];> 5 sec in [2];>
6 sec in [21]). As such, it is difficult to distinguish between initial time-locked responses to the
violation of predictions and cumulative responses that might reflect post-hoc processes [17].
The shorter time scale at which pupillary responses occur may provide unique insights into
how different explanatory variables are used to form predictions over time.
Predictive models in development
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In the current study, we investigated how 18-month-old infants and 24-month-old toddlers
build up predictions about others’ actions. Do they, as suggested by previous studies, integrate
information about prior probabilities and current observations to predict a subsequent event?
Moreover, is the fact that the agent performing the action might have a bias also taken into
account? In an experiment in which young children observed an agent performing a series of
more or less probable sampling actions, we analyzed the changes in pupillary responses over
trials to examine in a fine-grained manner how infants and toddlers build up predictions
about an agent’s sampling actions. Here, it is important to note that differently from previous
studies (e.g., [2], [21]) we measured the pupillary responses after each sampled outcome sepa-
rately. This unique feature of our design allowed us to monitor how infants’ predictions and
the resulting prediction errors evolved over time.
We created an experimental setting in which children observed a puppet drawing balls
from a population box and placing them in a row in an open container one by one. The popu-
lation box contained balls of two colors, with a ratio of 1:4. In the Minority-first condition, the
puppet first performed a series of improbable actions by picking four colored balls of the
minority color, before picking a ball in the majority color. In the Majority-first condition, the
puppet performed a series of more probable actions by drawing four balls of the majority
color, followed by one minority color ball.
Our computational approach allowed us to generate distinct hypotheses prior to data col-
lection. We formalized three hypotheses to investigate how young children predict others’
sampling actions. These formalized hypotheses (of which the precise computational character-
ization is presented in S1 Appendix) provided us with a predicted pattern of prediction errors
in all trials and conditions. We assume that in our experimental setup, there are three variables
that are used to model the environment: (1) the previous observations (i.e. the balls that were
sampled before), (2) the prior probabilities of an event (i.e. the probability of balls of a certain
color being picked given the relative number of balls in a population), (3) the agent’s biases
(i.e. tendency to pick a certain color). These variables increase in terms of level of complexity:
whereas the first one is dependent on change detection, the second one relies on statistical
inference, and the third one is based on processing of unobservable agent information. The
hypotheses differ with respect to whether and how these variables are taken into account.
According to the first hypothesis, children make predictions solely based on the sample
drawn so far. In other words, if a green ball were drawn from the population before, the best
prediction of the next event would be that another green ball would be drawn. As evidence
builds up, this prediction gets stronger, resulting in decreasing prediction errors over the
course of trials. However, when the last ball differs from the previous ones, this should lead to
an increase in prediction errors. As a result, over time, one would observe a decrease in pupil-
lary responses in both the Minority-first and Majority-first conditions, as several balls of the
same color are being picked repeatedly (see Fig 1A). However, when the last ball differs from
the previous ones, one would expect the pupillary response to increase for the last sampling
event as compared to the previous event in both conditions. In the first hypothesis, informa-
tion about the fact that the ball was sampled from a population with a specific distribution or
sampled by an agent who may have certain biases is assumed not to be taken into account.
The second hypothesis predicts that children do take probabilistic information about the
population into account, but still ignore the information about the agent. This hypothesis
entails that children use both prior probability and current observations to predict the next
sampling event: a green ball picked from a mostly yellow population is improbable, but
becomes slightly more probable after it happened a few times. Based on this hypothesis, one
would expect the pupillary response for the first two trials to be large for the Minority-first con-
dition. However, when balls of the same color are picked repeatedly, the pupillary responses
Predictive models in development
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Fig 1. The estimated size of the prediction error (and pupil dilation thereof) for the two experimental conditions as
predicted by the computational models, based on Hypothesis 1 (A), Hypothesis 2 (B), and Hypothesis 3 (C).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200976.g001
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should decrease in the subsequent trials. Yet, when the last ball differs from the previous obser-
vations but it is more probable given the distribution of colors in the population box, we
expected the pupillary responses to increase only slightly from the fourth to the fifth sampling
event. In the Majority-first condition, on the other hand, one would expect the pupillary
responses to be lower in the initial trials, as compared to the Minority-first condition, given
that it is more probable to pick yellow balls from the given population box. However, because
the last ball is different from the previous ones and it is less probable given the ratio of balls in
the population box, we predicted a larger increase in the pupillary responses from the fourth to
the fifth sampling event in Majority-first condition as compared to the Minority-first condition
(see Fig 1B).
According to the third hypothesis, children do not only process the sampling actions as
probabilistic events, but they also consider unobservable variables such as an agent’s bias while
doing so. They integrate the prior probability and current observations in a way that includes
agent characteristics as an explanatory variable that predicts observed actions. If an agent con-
sistently performs an improbable action, then sampling might not be random but driven by
some characteristics of the agent (e.g., a bias for picking a certain color). In terms of experi-
mental findings, this hypothesis predicts that children show larger pupillary responses in the
Minority-first condition, as compared to the Majority-first condition, during the first trials,
because it is less probable to pick the minority balls repeatedly from the population box. Then,
as several minority balls are selected in a row in the Minority-first condition, the joint probabil-
ity of the events as a whole becomes so low that children will update their models. As a result,
pupil dilation should decrease after the first few trials, as they will then assume that the agent
deliberately selects balls in minority colors because of a picking bias and will expect the agent
to keep doing this, consistent with this picking bias. However, as the last ball differs from the
first four, their predictions based on the updated model will be violated and there will be a
large increase in the pupillary responses again in this condition. On the other hand, in the
Majority-first condition, there is no reason to reject the assumption that the agent samples ran-
domly. Therefore, neither the fact that majority colors are being picked in a row nor the color
of the last ball deviates from the previous ones is too surprising: the distribution of colors in
the sample is consistent with the distribution in the population. If this is the case, the pupillary
responses in the first few trials in Majority-first condition will be lower than in the Minority-
first condition and they will only slightly increase in the last trial as compared to the previous
trial, as the last balls differs from the previous observations (see Fig 1C).
Children’s predictions of other’s actions may become more precise over the course of devel-
opment. For example, they might get more precise in representing statistical information, as
they get older. It could also be that given the increased amount of social experience, they might
become more proficient in recognizing others’ preferences. Indeed, developmental research
on social cognition suggests that children’s attributions in social situations change as they
accumulate more statistical evidence about agents in different situations through experience
[22], [23]. For example, Ma and Xu (2011) investigated whether 24-month-old toddlers and
16-month-old infants use statistical information to infer that others might have preferences
different from their own [24]. Although 24-month-olds first assumed that the experimenter
would share their preference for a certain object, they were able to revise this assumption
when the experimenter repeatedly chose another object, only if sampling appeared to be non-
random. Whereas 24-month-old children were able to infer that the experimenter had a pref-
erence different from their own, 16-month-old infants showed weaker evidence for such an
inference. As Ma and Xu (2011) argue, these findings suggest that the ability to reason about
the subjective nature of preferences develops between 16 months and 2 years of age [24].
Given the previous literature, we included two age groups (i.e. 24- and 18-month-olds) in the
Predictive models in development
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current experiment to investigate if the use of probabilistic and agent information in predict-
ing others’ actions changes between 18 and 24 months.
Our modeling work provides us with an estimation of prediction errors in different trials
and conditions. We then qualitatively compared these predicted patterns of results to the
actual changes in pupil dilation for both age groups. With this, we provide more insight into
the way in which children use prior probabilities, current observations and agent information
to predict others’ actions, and how they revise their predictions over time.
Materials and methods
Participants
We tested 48 18-month-old infants (M = 18 months 2 days; range 17 months 11 days–18
months 13 days) and 57 24-month-infants (M = 24 months 1 day; range 23 months 4 days–24
months 15 days) for the study. Ten 18-month-olds and six 24-month-olds did not complete
the testing session due to fussiness. There were 20 and 21 24-month-old-infants in the final sta-
tistical analyses in the Minority-first and Majority-first conditions, respectively. Participants
were recruited from a database of volunteer families, and parents gave written informed con-
sent for the study. Radboud University Nijmegen Social Science Faculty’s ethical committee
approved the study. All children were born full-term and had no reported developmental
delays. Participating families received a book or 10 Euros in return.
Stimuli
We created familiarization and test movies that showed animal hand puppets sampling col-
ored balls from a population box and placing them one by one in an open container. The pop-
ulation box was transparent in front and had a white opaque cover on top in order to hide the
sampling action. This part also served as an occluder to keep the puppets out of sight when
they left the scene each time after they had drawn a ball from the population box. An opaque
tube that was attached to the box led to the container on the left side of the box (see Fig 2A–
2C).
Familiarization movie
In the familiarization movie (Fig 2A), a frog puppet popped up from behind the occluded part
of the population box and started an introductory talk dubbed by a female voice. The puppet
introduced itself and presented the population box, the tube and the container to the child. It
then popped down to pick a ball from a population box filled with only blue balls before
appearing again and moving towards the tube. The puppet’s hands and the ball were hidden
behind the opaque part on top of the box until it put the ball into the tube. The puppet then
quickly left the scene so that distraction was minimized during the measurement of the pupil-
lary response in test trials. Immediately after the puppet disappeared, a rolling sound was
played and the ball appeared on the left side of the container. The rolling ball was not shown to
the viewer in order to ensure that participants did not see its color until it appeared in the con-
tainer. The puppet then popped up again and explained that the balls roll all the way down to
the end, in order to familiarize the child with the sudden appearance of the balls in the con-
tainer. This process was repeated for five times and took 2.07 minutes in total.
Test movies
Four different animal hand puppets, dubbed by two male and two female voices, were used to
depict the different conditions (see S1 File). Each trial in which the puppet picked one ball was
Predictive models in development
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Fig 2. Snapshots from stimulus movies of the (A) Familiarization, (B) Minority-first condition, and (C) Majority-first condition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200976.g002
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considered as a sampling event. One condition included five consecutive sampling events, in
other words, five trials. We filmed each puppet for the Majority-first as well as for the Minor-
ity-first condition to counterbalance the conditions and the associated agents across partici-
pants. Test movies (see Fig 2B and 2C) were similar to the familiarization movie in terms of
the set-up. However, the population box was now filled with balls in two different colors. In all
movies, there was a 1:4 ratio of green and yellow balls.
As in the familiarization movie, the puppet gave a short introduction in which it told the
participants its name, explored the set-up and explained that it would now pick a ball. Then, it
popped down behind the white opaque part to pick a ball. At this point, the agent was not visi-
ble but a rumbling sound was presented while the balls moved inside the population box in
order to indicate that the agent was picking a ball. Because the puppet was not visible when the
balls were being picked, it was not obvious from the way in which the sampling action was per-
formed whether it was random or not. The puppet then popped up from behind the opaque
part, carried the ball, and put the ball into the tube. During this period, the ball that the puppet
picked was still not visible to the participants. Immediately after the puppet left the scene, a
rolling sound started lasting for 1400 milliseconds until the ball appeared on the left side of the
container. The display of the sampled ball was shown for 4000 milliseconds. The puppet
repeated the same process five times, picking balls one by one from the box. In the Minority-
first condition, children observed the puppet drawing the minority color balls from the popu-
lation box four times in a row before picking one majority color ball (see Fig 2B). In the Major-
ity-first condition, the puppet drew four majority color balls followed by a minority color ball
(see Fig 2C). We measured changes in pupil dilation after each sampling event. Majority-first
and Minority-first conditions were shown twice to all participants. Although it was not a priori
decision, as most participants got distracted quickly after observing the first five consecutive
sampling events, only data for this first condition (i.e. Minority-first or Majority-first) were
included in the analyses (see S2 File). In this way, we also ensured that carry-over effects that
might occur due to the repetition of sampling sequences would not influence our data. The
entire stimulus presentation consisted of the initial familiarization condition and both condi-
tions shown twice (S2 File). One test movie lasted for 1.48 minutes and the entire stimulus pre-
sentation lasted for 8 minutes.
The stimulus material was edited in post-production using Final Cut Studio 3 (Apple Inc.).
The movies were further edited using open source video editor software Kdenlive (version
0.9.6) to match the timing and the durations of each movie. As pupillary responses are sensi-
tive to light effects, we paid utmost attention to luminance factors. In order to ensure that the
movies had similar luminance values, we color-corrected the movies using Color software
(version 1.5, Apple Inc.). The audio material for the movies was recorded and edited to match
the pitch and speed of the audio material between movies using Audacity software (version
2.0.5).
Experimental set-up and procedure
The testing procedure was identical for both age groups. Eye movements were recorded with a
corneal reflection eye-tracker (Tobii 120, Tobii Technology, Danderyd, Sweden) recording
gaze data at 60 Hz using a 9-point calibration procedure. The procedure was repeated if seven
or fewer calibration points were detected until data for at least eight calibration points was
acquired.
To control for the external luminance effects, the natural lighting was entirely blocked and
the room lights were on during the calibration and testing. In order to make sure that the envi-
ronmental luminance was at a certain range during the measurements, we recorded the
Predictive models in development
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environmental luminance during each testing using a custom-made device attached to the
eye-tracker (Atlas Scientific ENV-RGB Color Detector Probe, version 1.6, combined with
Arduino hardware), and the luminance values were extracted via Arduino software (version
1.0.5). The external luminance values were between 187–195 lux across testings. Participants
were seated on their parent’s lap. All participants viewed the testing material at approximately
60 cm distance.
Measures
We measured the pupillary responses for each sampling event during the first 2000 ms after
the sampled ball was visible in the container. Pupil data were analyzed using custom-made
MATLAB scripts (MathWorks, Friedrichsdorf, Germany). The data were cleaned via several
preprocessing steps. First, we screened for missing data points. If pupil dilation values were
available for both eyes, then these were averaged in order to obtain one value per sample. In
case of a missing value for one of the eyes, only the value from the other eye was used for the
analyses. If the difference between the left and the right eye was larger than 1 (which is consid-
ered an indication of anisocoria: a condition characterized by unequal pupil sizes) or if average
values were higher than two standard deviations from the mean, the data point was considered
unreliable and registered as missing. Missing data points due to blinks were corrected using a
linear interpolation algorithm, in which the maximum sample gap was set to 5. Following
interpolation, the data were smoothed using median and moving average filtering in order to
reduce the noise in the signal. If there were more than 60 missing samples in one trial of 2000
ms, the entire trial was excluded from the analyses. Pupil diameter changes were obtained by
subtracting the average pupil diameter for each sampling trial from a fixed baseline period
defined as the first 1000 ms from the start of each movie before the puppet appeared for the
first time. Here, we aimed to find a window during the stimulus presentation when partici-
pants do not have any information regarding the sampled outcomes and the agent (it was not
possible to have a period when the box was not visible). Because we reasoned that information
such as the previous samples and the agents would modulate infant’s responses, we picked a
baseline period during which none of this information was available. Finally, in case a value
for one trial deviated more than two standard deviations from the overall trial average, it was
considered an outlier and removed from further analyses. Before computing further statistical
analyses on the data, we first conducted one sample t-tests against zero for each age group to
ensure that there were indeed significant changes in pupillary responses as compared to the
baseline level (cf. [16]. These analyses were informative as they provided a validation check for
further statistical analyses testing the effects of task manipulations on pupillary responses.
Results
Measuring the pupillary responses after each sampled outcome separately allowed us to moni-
tor how the children’s predictions evolved over time. One sample t-tests for 18-month-olds
showed that overall, there was no significant change in pupillary responses as compared to the
baseline level (t (34) = 1.11, p = .27). On the other hand, 24-month-olds showed significant
increases in their pupillary responses as compared to baseline level (t (50) = 4.18, p< .01).
Pupillary responses of the 24-month-olds and the 18-month-olds are illustrated in Fig 3 and
Fig 4, respectively.
Because there was no difference in pupil response as compared to the baseline level in
18-month-olds, we did not compute further analyses for this age group. We reasoned that fur-
ther analyses with this age group would be uninformative if not misleading given that there
were no changes in pupillary responses as compared to the baseline level, which nullify
Predictive models in development
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interpretations of the changes in pupil dilation as a function of different trials and conditions.
As we did find a significant change in overall pupillary responses as compared to the baseline
level in 24-month-olds, we focused our further analyses on this age group.
As we predicted differential response patterns for different combinations of trials given the
differences in sampled outcomes, we examined the first two and last two trials separately. To
examine participants’ initial responses to the probability of the outcomes, we first ran a
repeated measures ANOVA with condition (Minority-first vs. Majority-first) as a between-
subjects factor and first two trials (1 and 2) as a within-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a
significant trial by condition interaction (F (1, 42) = 4.80, p = .03, η2 = 0.10). As shown in Fig
3, this interaction was mostly driven by the larger difference in pupil dilation between condi-
tions in the second trial. Still, follow-up t-tests showed that in the first trial, pupillary responses
significantly differed between the Minority-first condition (M = .22, SD = .20) and the Major-
ity-first condition (M = .08, SD = .22), t (46) = 2.15, p = .04. Similarly, in the second trial, the
difference in pupillary responses between the Minority-first condition (M = .25, SD = .18) and
Fig 3. Average change in pupil size as compared to a fixed baseline period in Minority-first (black line) and
Majority-first (gray line) conditions over the course of trials in 24-month-olds. Error bars represent SEMs.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200976.g003
Fig 4. Average change in pupil size as compared to a fixed baseline period in Minority-first (black line) and
Majority-first (gray line) conditions over the course of trials in 18-month-olds. Error bars represent SEMs.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200976.g004
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the Majority-first condition (M = .01, SD = .29) was significant, t (40.61) = 3.47, p< .01. These
results show that in both trials, 24-month-old toddlers’ pupil dilation was larger when they
observed an improbable sampling action as compared to a probable action. This finding sup-
ports the sub hypothesis of both the second and the third hypothesis: toddlers initially expected
the samples to represent the distribution in the population box, thereby assuming that the
agent samples from the box randomly. Moreover, as the joint probability of sampled outcomes
became less probable with each sample in the Minority-first condition, the difference between
the conditions became larger in the second trial.
When toddlers observed the agent consistently performing an improbable action (i.e.,
selecting minority color balls repeatedly), our third hypothesis would assume that this led them
to revise their predictions: sampling might not be random, but biased towards a certain color
because of some characteristics of the agent (e.g., the agent deliberately selects a certain color).
After such a revision of their predictions, children would start expecting the agent to pick the
minority color ball (which was previously considered improbable) and now would be surprised
to see the majority color ball appear. On the other hand, when toddlers observed the agent con-
sistently performing a more probable action (i.e., picking majority color balls), there would be
no reason to revise the predictions. In order to test this assumption, we analyzed the differences
in pupillary responses right before and after observing a change in the agent’s picking behavior.
Using a repeated measures ANOVA with condition (Minority-first and Majority-first) as a
between-subjects factor and trials (4 and 5) as a within-subjects factor, we analyzed the pupillary
responses of the 24-month-olds in different conditions on the last two trials. As predicted
according to the third hypothesis, data revealed a significant interaction between condition and
trials (F (1, 39) = 4.46, p = .04, η2 = 0.09). Follow-up t-test analyses showed that in the fourth
trial, there was no significant difference in pupillary responses between the Minority-first condi-
tion (M = .16, SD = .20) and the Majority-first condition (M = .07, SD = .28), t (43) = 1.21, p =
.23. However, in the fifth trial, pupil dilation in the Minority-first condition (M = .27, SD = .16)
increased significantly, whereas this was not the case for the Majority-first condition (M = .09,
SD = .22), t (38.65) = 3.01, p< .01. This finding is crucial, as it shows that toddlers combined
observed outcomes and the information about the prior probability of an event with unob-
served agent characteristics to predict the agent’s sampling actions over time. They thus showed
increased response when their prediction was violated, which was assumed in the third hypoth-
esis, but not in the other two hypotheses (see Fig 1C and Fig 3).
Discussion
In this study, we investigated how 18-month-old infants and 24-month-old toddlers build up
predictions about others’ actions. We defined three explanatory variables that one might use
when predicting the actions of another person: (1) previously observed events, (2) the prior
probability of certain events, and (3) the characteristics of an agent. These three variables can
be ordered with respect to their complexity. The first one only involves simple change detec-
tion, the second one uses statistical inference and the third one requires processing of unob-
servable agent information. Accordingly, we developed three hypotheses each including one
relevant variable more than the previous, thus building up in their level of processing complex-
ity. We tested these hypotheses in an experiment in which young children observed a puppet
picking colored balls one by one from a population box. Their pupillary responses were mea-
sured after each sampling event and were assumed to be an index of prediction errors.
Our findings showed that 24-month-old toddlers integrate the prior probability and current
observations as well as an agent’s biases to predict an agent’s sampling actions, and thereby
supported the third hypothesis. Because we measured the pupillary responses after each
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sampled outcome separately, we were able to monitor how their predictions and the resulting
prediction errors evolved over time. Toddlers showed significantly larger pupillary responses
when they observed an improbable as compared to a probable sampling action in the first two
trials. This finding is in line with the assumption that young children form predictions based
on the available statistical information: they predict that the distribution in a sample will reflect
the distribution in the population from which they are drawn [21], [2] and are thus surprised
when this prediction is violated.
Moreover, our findings suggest that repeated observations of the improbable outcome
allowed toddlers to revise their predictions. They no longer assumed that the agent’s actions
were random, but rather that they reflected a picking bias. As the agent consistently performed
an improbable action, they expected the agent to keep showing this picking bias. However,
when they observed that the last pick differed from the previous ones, this prediction was vio-
lated. The resulting prediction error caused a larger increase in their pupillary responses in the
last trial in the Minority-first condition, as compared to the Majority-first condition. In the
Majority-first condition, the overall sample resembled the distribution in the population box.
Because this outcome was highly probable, the fact that the last ball had a different color did
not lead to a strong increase in the pupillary response. These findings are in line with the idea
that young children combine information about the prior probability of an event, observed
outcomes and agent characteristics to predict an agent’s sampling actions.
Our findings suggest that 24-month-olds integrate agent information into their predictions.
When a sample becomes highly improbable given the distribution in the population, toddlers
no longer assume that the sampling is random. Rather, they assume that the sampling is driven
by specific characteristics of the agent: for some reason, the agent deliberately selects one
color. For example, this reason could be a preference for one color over the other or a task that
has been given to this agent.
Whereas the 24-month-olds in our study showed clear indications of integrating previously
observed events, prior probability information and the agent characteristics to form predic-
tions, pupillary responses of 18-month-olds were inconclusive. Here, it is crucial to note that
the lack of changes in pupil diameter as compared to the baseline, as it is the case for
18-month-old in the current study, is not evidence for absence of certain cognitive processes.
In other words, the lack of meaningful pupillary responses in 18-month-old infants does not
necessarily imply that 18-month-olds lack the abilities to attribute picking bias to agents. Nev-
ertheless, previous studies have shown that even 10-month-old infants use statistical informa-
tion to guide their inferences about others’ actions (e.g., [25], [20]). Because we observed no
changes in 18-month-old infants’ pupillary responses as compared to baseline, we think that
findings from this age group should not be interpreted. Accordingly, we can only speculate
about the factors that might have led to the current findings.
Using looking time measures, Wellman and colleagues (2016) have shown that 10-month-
old infants use probabilistic information to infer others’ preferences [20]. In this study,
10-month-old infants observed an agent sampling balls from a box. Infants who had seen this
agent sampling balls from a minority color during a habituation phase looked longer when the
sampled ball during the test event had a different color than when it had the same color. How-
ever, there was no such difference for the infants who had seen this agent sampling balls from
a majority color during the habituation phase. The results are interpreted as evidence that a
violation of expectations during the habituation phase, which only occurred when the agent
sampled balls from a minority color, led the infants to attribute to the agent a preference for
the sampled color.
Despite investigating a similar research question, there were theoretical and methodological
differences between the study by Wellman and colleagues (2016) and the current one [20]. For
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example, in the study by Wellman and colleagues (2016), a live actor sampled items from the
population box [20]. Previous literature has shown that when infants observed a nonrandom
sample, they expected that a person had drawn the sample but not a mechanical claw [24]. It
might be that 18-month-old infants did not attribute a picking bias to the agents in the current
study, thus, they did not show any differential pupil dilation response, as the agents were non-
human. Moreover, here, we aimed to investigate infants’ predictions about others’ sampling
actions and measured their pupillary responses as a behavioral proxy of predictions errors.
Because pupil dilation is an involuntary response that occurs in a shorter time scale as compared
to cumulative measures such as looking times, it would be reasonable to assume that current
study tackles a different aspect of infant cognition as compared to previous studies. Whereas we
measured immediate time-locked responses to the violations of predictions, previous studies
focused on post-hoc processes observed in longer periods. Taken together, these theoretical and
methodological discrepancies might account for differences in findings across studies.
One could also speculate that the 18-month-old infants’ models might not be advanced
enough to integrate all three explanatory variables and the interactions between them. Alterna-
tively, even if their internal models were advanced, they may not have generated very precise
predictions resulting in low weighting on the prediction errors. For example, based on their
internal model, infants may have a vague idea that what happened before is likely to happen
again (cf. Hypothesis 1), but this idea might have been too weak to generate a prediction with
high precision. Therefore, no or only a very weak prediction error would arise if this prediction
is violated. Furthermore, it could even be the case that their internal models did not incorpo-
rate the causal link between the agent and the appearance of the balls, potentially preventing
them from encoding the relevance of the color of the balls. Therefore, because of immature
internal models, infants could have had weaker predictions or incorrect predictions all of
which could explain the lack of overlap between their pupil response data and our hypotheses.
Predictive models of the environment might get more mature over the course of develop-
ment, allowing children to make precise or detailed predictions about events. In daily life, chil-
dren experience many events and most of the time there is a structure in these events. Certain
events follow each other, which enables them to learn the regularities in the environment, and
eventually the causal structure behind events [26]. Repeated experiences of certain events
might allow them to improve their model of the world to make more precise or detailed pre-
dictions. With many of these experiences, a general model of the world develops. As children
gather evidence on many different occasions involving a variety of agents and objects they
choose, they collect more and more world knowledge. For example, they might see a friend
repeatedly picking strawberries rather than pears or their father taking coffee rather than tea.
All these experiences together might allow them to integrate new information in their world
model efficiently. In other words, as their world knowledge improves, they become better at
inferring the causes of others’ behavior without observing many occurrences. As a result, tod-
dlers might need less information to form a certain prediction about other agents’ choices.
Potentially, 24-month-olds have gathered the world knowledge necessary to be able to use the
three explanatory variables in our experiment in the way specified in the third hypothesis.
These findings shed light upon the mechanisms behind toddlers’ inferences about agent-
caused events, as they suggest that from 24 months of age relevant information from the envi-
ronment is used to form predictions about the causes of these events.
Conclusions
We presented formalized hypotheses of how young children combine perceptual, statistical
and agent-related information to infer others’ biases. Our findings support the hypothesis that
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24-month-old toddlers are able to integrate information about individual agents with informa-
tion about previous events and prior probabilities to predict others’ actions. Moreover, we pres-
ent an innovative approach in which young children’s pupillary responses are used as indirect
behavioral markers of prediction errors. The pattern of pupillary responses in 24-month-olds,
but not 18-month-olds, showed strong similarities with the prediction error patterns formalized
by a predictive processing model. Our findings suggest that young children integrate informa-
tion about current observations, prior probabilities and agents to predict others’ actions.
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